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INTRODUCTION
The chief challenge presented by an opportunity1 to comment on the
“Worst Supreme Court Opinion, Ever,” is that so many candidates vie for the
title. Fortunately, Professor Stempel has stipulated that the identification of a
champion in no way implies acquiescence in any unnamed judicial wrongs.2
No sane scholar could accept the invitation on any other terms.
No doubt my choice of the Court’s Prohibition-Era ruling in Nigro v.
United States3 is a surprising one. Most scholars and lawyers have probably
never even heard of the decision nor of the 1914 federal narcotics law that it
unconscionably upheld. Nigro’s obscurity might be thought to foreclose its
claim to incomparable iniquity. In fact, however, Nigro’s anonymity is both
consequence and evidence of the thoroughness of its distortion of our funda-
mental law. The effect of its error proved so profoundly transformative that the
world it helped to destroy has been virtually forgotten. Nigro accomplished the
astounding feat of covering its own tracks.
But Nigro deserves a prominent place in our pantheon of infamy, and this
Essay aims to put it there. For Nigro not only contributed mightily to the
demise of the enumerated powers doctrine, arguably the central feature of the
Constitution of 1787, but, as my title asserts, was almost certainly the product
of self-conscious duplicity on the part of at least some of the Justices in the
majority. The only alternative to this latter conclusion is to attribute to them a
failure in self-criticism so grave as to be as culpable as outright dishonesty. The
case for (against?) Nigro can be made at many levels.
This Essay makes that case. Part I provides the background and historical
context necessary to appreciate fully the extent of Nigro’s wickedness. Part II
then examines the Supreme Court’s ruling. Part III explores the consequences
of that neglect of judicial duty. Part IV explains, and laments, Nigro’s present
relevance.
* Professor, University of Cincinnati College of Law. For their comments and suggestions, I
thank Lou Bilionis, Emily Houh, Tom McAffee, Darrell Miller, Jeff Stempel, and Verna
Williams. Thanks also to Sarah Topy and Chris Kunz for excellent research assistance, and
the University of Cincinnati College of Law and the Harold C. Schott Foundation for
financial support. Of course, remaining errors are mine alone.
1 My deep and sincere gratitude to Jeff Stempel for the invitation.
2 Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Worst Supreme Court Case Ever? Identifying, Assessing, and
Exploring Low Moments of the High Court, 12 NEV. L.J. 516 (2012).
3 Nigro v. United States, 276 U.S. 332 (1928).
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I. THE FIRST SHOT IN THE FEDERAL “WAR ON DRUGS”
The Harrison Anti-Narcotics Act of 19144 was precisely what its title sug-
gested, an anti-drug law, pure and simple. In the twenty-first century, the Court
has candidly acknowledged as much.5 But when enacted, the statute suffered
from the significant defect that a federal prohibition on the possession or use of
even the most serious narcotics was quite clearly unconstitutional. Coming as it
did before judicial abdication of the duty to enforce the Constitution’s limit of
the federal government to only those powers found therein, the Act was fatally
flawed as no enumerated power even arguably reached so far. To be sure, Con-
gress might have then been able to condition use of the instrumentalities, or
travel in the channels, of interstate commerce on compliance with a regulatory
regime designed to preserve public morals from recreational self-pollution.6
But even so, the power would have depended upon the showing of an interstate
nexus on a case-by-case basis,7 and the Harrison Act applied regardless of any
such jurisdictional hook. Thus, Congress dressed the Act, which in reality
enacted a prohibitory regime, in the garb of a federal tax.
Though few if any were fooled by this ruse, the fiction sufficed to get the
law through Congress, signed by President Wilson, and sustained against con-
stitutional challenge by the Supreme Court. In United States v. Doremus,8 a
five-Justice majority refused to look behind the transparent form to the appar-
ent substance. Reasoning that many taxes had incidental regulatory conse-
quences, the Court declared that Congress lawfully employed its Article I
power to “lay and collect Taxes”9 so long as a statute bore “some reasonable
relation” to the raising of revenue, even if the law’s “effect . . . [was] to accom-
plish another purpose as well.”10
Under even this highly deferential standard, however, the Harrison Act
was constitutionally suspect. As the federal trial court in Doremus had
observed (along the way to its conclusion that the Harrison Act was unconstitu-
tional), the nominal $1 per annum tax raised no net revenue, not surprisingly as
the Act “so restrict[ed] and narrow[ed] the uses of the drug that no vital or
important excess of revenue could reasonably be expected.”11 Moreover, the
Act’s requirements subjected the malefactor to draconian criminal punishments
“so disproportionate to the gravamen of the offense as to be further convincing
4 Harrison Act, 38 Stat. 785, 785–90 (1914), amended by 40 Stat. 1130, 1130–33 (1919)
(repealed 1970).
5 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 10 (2005) (describing the Harrison Act as “the primary
drug control law” until Congress passed the Controlled Substance Act in 1970).
6 Compare, e.g., Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432, 436–37 (1925), Caminetti v. United
States, 242 U.S. 470, 491 (1917), and Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 356–57 (1903),
with, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 271–73 (1918).
7 See Brooks, 267 U.S. at 438–39; Dagenhart, 247 U.S. at 272; Caminetti, 242 U.S. at 485;
Champion, 188 U.S. at 354.
8 United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86 (1919).
9 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
10 Doremus, 249 U.S. at 93–94.
11 See United States v. Doremus, 246 F. 958, 964 (W.D. Tex. 1918).
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that Congress was more concerned with the moral ends to be subserved than
with the revenue to be derived.”12
Still, the High Court turned a blind eye to this evidence of the Harrison
Act’s actual purpose and effect. To be sure, judicial deference to claimed con-
gressional purposes may be defensible, indeed even laudable, in light of the
relative institutional competence and legitimacy of these two branches of the
national government. But selective deference is, of course, not deference at all
but rather merely a disguise for inchoate judicial policy judgments avowedly
the province of the legislature.
Subsequently the Court’s deference was revealed as highly selective. Just
prior to Doremus, the Court had struck down a federal statute prohibiting the
shipment in interstate commerce of goods manufactured at a plant employing
children below a minimum age or beyond maximum hours on the ground that it
exceeded Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.13 Now Doremus offered a
way for Congress to circumvent this limitation—tax child labor to extinction.
But when Congress did so, the Court demurred. Writing for eight Justices in
The Child Labor Tax Case,14 the new Chief Justice Taft sententiously invoked
the Court’s solemn constitutional duty. The justices were obliged to assess
independently whether a challenged “law impose[d] a tax with only that inci-
dental restraint and regulation which a tax must inevitably involve” or whether
the statute “regulate[d] by the use of the so-called tax as a penalty.”15
It is the high duty and function of this court in cases regularly brought to
its bar to decline to recognize or enforce seeming laws of Congress, dealing
with subjects not entrusted to Congress, but left or committed by the supreme
law of the land to the control of the states. We cannot avoid the duty, even
though it requires us to refuse to give effect to legislation designed to promote
the highest good. The good sought in unconstitutional legislation is an insidious
feature, because it leads citizens and legislators of good purpose to promote it,
without thought of the serious breach it will make in the ark of our covenant, or
the harm which will come from breaking down recognized standards. In the
maintenance of local self-government, on the one hand, and the national power,
on the other, our country has been able to endure and prosper for near a century
and a half.16
As to why this “high duty and function” did not require the Court to inval-
idate the Harrison Anti-Narcotics Act, Taft had little to say. His opinion identi-
fied only one supposed difference between the two statutes. Whereas the Child
Labor Tax Law was “on the face of the act . . . a penalty,” any ulterior motive
that may have contributed to the passage of the narcotics law was “not shown
on [its] face.”17 Of course even this distinction was specious. It simply ignored
the unanswered conclusion of the Doremus trial court and four Supreme Court
12 See id. (citation omitted).
13 See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276–77 (1918).
14 Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (The Child Labor Tax Case), 259 U.S. 20 (1922). Justice
Clarke dissented without an opinion. See id. at 44.
15 Id. at 36.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 39, 43.
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dissenters that the words of the Harrison Act standing alone revealed the law’s
actual purpose to be narcotics regulation, not revenue collection.18
Justices McReynolds and Sutherland joined Taft’s Child Labor Tax Case
opinion, but later signaled their unease with the Court’s blatant inconsistency
on federalism. In United States v. Daugherty,19 Justice McReynolds delivered
the opinion for a unanimous Court upholding a fifteen-year prison sentence
(which, McReynolds noted, “seem[ed] extremely harsh”)20 for a Harrison-Act
conviction. But McReynolds used the occasion to welcome—indeed to out-
line—an argument that Doremus, from which he had dissented, be overruled:
The constitutionality of the [Harrison] Anti Narcotic Act, touching which this court
so sharply divided in United States v. Doremus, was not raised below, and has not
been again considered. The doctrine approved in Hammer v. Dagenhart [and the]
Child Labor Tax Case may necessitate a review of that question, if hereafter properly
presented.21
Thus, McReynolds took the extraordinary step of announcing the Court’s
willingness to reconsider Doremus.22 His prophecy, however, proved a false
promise.
II. NIGRO’S UNHAPPY DAY IN THE HIGH COURT
Frank Nigro was indicted and convicted for selling an ounce of morphine
without compelling the purchaser to submit an order for the drug on a govern-
ment form, as section 2 of the Harrison Act arguably required.23 Chief Justice
Taft’s opinion for the Court rejecting his appeal first embraced the govern-
ment’s broad interpretation of the Act, which in effect criminalized receipt of
the covered narcotics by anyone absent a physician’s lawful prescription for an
approved medicinal use.24 So interpreted, the Act obviously constituted a spuri-
ous use of the taxing power to prohibit private conduct deemed dangerous and
immoral, a responsibility not entrusted by the Constitution’s enumerated pow-
ers to the federal government but rather one reserved to the states.
18 As David Currie observed in an analogous context, “It is hard to believe that the majority
found its own distinctions persuasive.” See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE
SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND CENTURY 1888–1986, at 98 (1990).
19 United States v. Daugherty, 269 U.S. 360 (1926).
20 Id. at 364.
21 Id. at 362–63 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
22 To be sure, just over a year after Daugherty, McReynolds wrote the Court’s opinion in
Alston v. United States, which rebuffed a federalism challenge to the Harrison Act. See
Alston v. United States, 274 U.S. 289, 294 (1927). In rejecting one constitutional challenge,
however, McReynolds expressly preserved a more compelling one for a future day. Alston
arose “under those provisions of [the Harrison Act] which impose[d] a stamp tax on certain
drugs and declare[d] it unlawful to purchase or sell them except in or from original stamped
packages.” Id. These provisions were the most impervious to constitutional attack because
they did “not absolutely prohibit buying or selling [and] ha[d] produced substantial reve-
nue.” See id. Accordingly, McReynolds deemed them to be “clearly within the power of
Congress to lay taxes,” stressing that they had “no necessary connection with any require-
ment of the act which may be subject to reasonable disputation.” Id. (emphasis added).
23 Nigro v. United States, 276 U.S. 332, 337–38 (1928).
24 See id. at 344.
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In form, at least, Chief Justice Taft agreed that the federal government
lacked any such power. Early in his analysis, he conceded that
[i]n interpreting the act, we must assume that it is a taxing measure, for otherwise it
would be no law at all. If it is a mere act for the purpose of regulating and restraining
the purchase of the opiate and other drugs, it is beyond the power of Congress, and
must be regarded as invalid, just as the Child Labor Act of Congress was held to
be.25
Nevertheless, Taft upheld the Act on the transparent fiction that its strict
constraints on both those who might sell and those who might buy narcotics
were merely incidental to tax collection.26 Taft reasoned that the section’s
requirement that purchasers also be registered (unless they held a valid physi-
cian’s prescription) relieved the revenue service of a significant enforcement
burden—namely, the need of “sending to examine the list” of registered sellers
to determine whether a particular seller’s name appeared thereon.27 But this
imagined administrative convenience was eclipsed by the prohibitory effect
worked by such a broad construction of the Act. Because would-be non-medici-
nal users were not even permitted to register, they could never obtain the forms
necessary to make a purchase.28 It was as if Congress prohibited the sale of all
alcoholic beverages in order to ensure that distributors paid the excise tax on
alcohol sales. Taft justified congressional elimination of the non-medicinal nar-
cotics market as a means of ensuring that the distributors in that market paid
their registration fees. The surgery succeeded, albeit by killing the patient.
McReynolds dissented in an opinion Sutherland joined. His dissent, like so
many of the best throughout the Court’s history, merely gave voice to what
must have been apparent to all.29 Having explained the prohibitory character of
what was nominally a registration regime, he made the commonsense observa-
tion that tax collection would not be aided by requiring purchasers to use a
federal form that they could not lawfully obtain.30 “[I]nhibition of sales ha[d]
no just relation to the collection of the tax laid on dealers,” and any “suggestion
to the contrary [was] fanciful.”31 Nor was it difficult to discern that Congress’s
“plain intent [was] to control the traffic within the States by preventing sales
except to registered persons and holders of prescriptions, and this amount[ed]
25 Id. at 341 (citing Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (The Child Labor Tax Case), 259 U.S. 20
(1922)).
26 Id. at 353–54.
27 Id. at 345. Chief Justice Taft also noted that, in the years intervening between the events
at issue in Doremus and those with which the instant case was concerned, Congress had
amended the Act to increase the tax and the revenue produced thereby. Id. at 353. For an
argument that because this intervening amendment augmented the revenue raised under the
Act, the amendment supplied the foundation for constitutionality woefully lacking in
Doremus, see Robert C. Brown, When Is a Tax Not a Tax?, 11 IND. L.J. 399, 421–22 (1936).
28 See Harold Gill Reuschlein & Albert B. Spector, Taxing and Spending: The Loaded Dice
of a Federal Economy, 23 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 20–21 (1937) (discussing the practical effect of
the Harrison Act).
29 Cf. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 557 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Every one
knows that the [Louisiana] statute in question had its origin in the purpose, not so much to
exclude white persons from railroad cars occupied by blacks, as to exclude colored people
from coaches occupied by or assigned to white persons.”).
30 See Nigro, 276 U.S. at 356 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
31 Id.
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to an attempted regulation of something reserved to the States.”32 McReynolds
closed his brief dissent by noting the broad implications of the Court’s ruling
for federalism:
The habit of smoking tobacco is often deleterious. Many think it ought to be sup-
pressed. The craving for diamonds leads to extravagance, and frequently to crime.
Silks are luxuries, and their use abridges the demand for cotton and wool. Those who
sell tobacco, or diamonds, or silks may be taxed by the United States. But, surely, a
provision in an act laying such a tax which limited sales of cigars, cigarettes, jewels,
or silks to some small class alone authorized to secure official blanks would not be
proper or necessary in order to enforce collection. The acceptance of such a doctrine
would bring many purely local matters within the potential control of the federal
government. The admitted evils incident to the use of opium cannot justify disregard
of the powers ‘reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.’33
Unlike his colleagues in the majority, McReynolds resisted the temptation
to honor federalism in the breach in service of the apparently worthy causes of
preventing addiction and preserving traditional mores. This self-restraint was
all the more remarkable given McReynolds’s well-known antipathy to unortho-
dox social behavior.34
On the surface, Nigro was justifiable as faithful adherence to its prior rul-
ing in Doremus. In the meantime, however, the Court had purported to stand on
a federalism principle in the context of child labor, one of the most compelling
and divisive social issues of the day.35 The Court’s child-labor decisions pro-
voked a massive effort to supersede them by constitutional amendment.36
McReynolds saw that a partial federalism was indefensible and unsustainable.
Worse still, it was not really federalism at all, but rather merely a convenient
judicial tool for jurists to dismantle laws they did not like for other, unspoken
reasons, leaving intact laws equally obnoxious to federalism principles that the
judges happened to believe salutary. Such a regime empowers unelected, life-
tenured judges to pick and choose among federal statutes on a basis they never
need articulate let alone defend. To his enduring credit, McReynolds declined
to participate in this constitutional farce. But his was a voice crying in the
wilderness, heard but unheeded. Instead, his prophecy of federalism’s demise
soon earned the dubious honor of subsequent vindication.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 357 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. X).
34 McReynolds expressly acknowledged the “evils incident to the use of opium.” Id. at 357
(McReynolds, J., dissenting). For a discussion of McReynolds’s disdain for outsiders and
non-traditional conduct, see JAMES E. BOND, I DISSENT: THE LEGACY OF CHIEF JUSTICE
JAMES CLARK MCREYNOLDS 124–26, 136 (1992).
35 See supra notes 13–17 and accompanying text.
36 See DAVID E. KYVIG, EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS: AMENDING THE U.S. CONSTITU-
TION, 1776–1995, at 255–61, 307–13 (1996).
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III. THE WAGES OF JUDICIAL SIN
Judicial inconstancy and duplicity are deplorable regardless of observable
consequences. They constitute violations of a judge’s most fundamental obliga-
tions in a society premised on the rule of law.37
Nigro’s unique harm, however, far exceeded that attributable to the ordi-
nary judicial delict. Most obviously it entrenched the allocation of drug policy
to the national level, resulting in a century-long blunderbuss “war on drugs”
characterized by few if any tangible victories but with as many as a million
casualties distributed throughout the exponentially increasing federal prison
system.38 But even if one believes this approach to the problem of self-poison a
wise one, there remains the far more sweeping consequence that federalism, in
the form of the enumerated powers doctrine, became a distant memory.
Nigro was one of a handful of cases that revealed the Court’s avowed
commitment to an avowedly apolitical enforcement of the limits on congres-
sional power for the sham that it was. Indeed, the Court embraced broad asser-
tions of federal authority at least as often as it resisted them. Moreover, this
inconsistency was hardly random. Federal progressive economic or labor legis-
lation were met with suspicion, whereas federal morals regulations, like the
Harrison Act, were nearly always sustained. This pattern became increasingly
evident through the first two decades of the twentieth century.39 Numerous,
distinguished commentators40—of whom Princeton’s Edward Corwin41 was
probably the most prominent42—documented in detail the Court’s unforgivable
fickleness in its federalism jurisprudence.
“In 1930 Charles Evan Hughes succeeded as chief justice the man who
had, then as president, first appointed Hughes to the Court twenty years before.
37 See generally BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END: THREAT TO THE RULE
LAW 227 (2006).
38 See Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 564 (6th Cir. 2011) (Sutton, J.,
concurring) (observing that “States’ rights sometimes are individual rights. Doubt it? Go to
any federal prison in the country to see how a broad conception of the commerce power has
affected individual liberty through the passage of federal gun-possession and drug-posses-
sion laws and sentencing mandates.”) (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted); Robert Higgs,
Lock’em Up!, 4 INDEP. REV. 309, 309–13 (1999) (discussing phenomenal growth of the U.S.
state and federal prison populations and attributing much of it to drug prohibition).
39 A. Christopher Bryant, The Third Death of Federalism, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
101, 122–29 (2007) (documenting contemporaneous discussion of the Justices’ manipulation
of federalism to achieve favored outcomes).
40 See, e.g., Robert E. Cushman, Social and Economic Control Through Federal Taxation,
18 MINN. L. REV. 759, 782–83 (1934); Thurlow M. Gordon, The Child Labor Law Case, 32
HARV. L. REV. 45, 65 (1918); Joseph R. Long, Federal Police Regulation by Taxation, 9 VA.
L. REV. 81, 96 (1922); Arthur W. Machen, Jr., The Strange Case of Florida v. Mellon, 13
CORNELL L.Q. 351, 375 (1928); Thomas Reed Powell, The Child Labor Law, the Tenth
Amendment, and the Commerce Clause, 3 S.L.Q. 175, 201–02 (1918).
41 See, e.g., EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE COMMERCE POWER VERSUS STATES RIGHTS: BACK
TO THE CONSTITUTION 254–55 (Peter Smith 1962) (1936).
42 G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 17 (2000) (describing
Corwin as “one of the ablest American scholars of the twentieth century”); Gerald Garvey,
Edward S. Corwin in the Campaign of History: The Struggle for National Power in the
1930s, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 219, 219 (1965) (asserting that “Corwin stands among the
giants of American constitutional commentators—with Kent, Story, and Cooley”).
Summer 2012] NIGRO V. UNITED STATES 657
At this changing of the guard,” judicial enforcement of the enumerated powers
scheme “rested on a frail foundation.”43 “Severe, sustained, world-wide eco-
nomic depression” shook that foundation tremendously.44 When at the begin-
ning of FDR’s second presidential term his clash with the Court reached its
apogee, the fact that the Court had built its federalism house on sand mightily
contributed to its collapse.45 By the early 1940s, the Justices had signaled that
Congress would henceforth be the principal if not sole judge of the scope of its
own powers.46
IV. CONCLUSION: HERE WE GO AGAIN (AND AGAIN?)
Thereafter, the abandonment of federalism to Congress’s painfully “under-
developed capacity for self-restraint”47 became the equilibrium that reigned
through most of the rest of the twentieth century—until 1995. The Court’s
decision that year in United States v. Lopez,48 as well as that ruling’s reaffirma-
tion five years later in United States v. Morrison,49 sparked a decade of hopes
and fears of a sweeping revival of judicially enforced limits on congressional
power. But in an astounding parallel to Nigro, the Court’s friendship with fed-
eralism collided with federal drug policy. Once again, the latter prevailed.
Angel Raich challenged the constitutionality of the federal Controlled
Substances Act (the much broader, linear successor of the Harrison Act) as
applied to her wholly intrastate, non-commercial possession of small amounts
of marijuana for medicinal purposes in conformity with the law of California,
where she resided. In the two decades before 1995, the claim that her conduct
lay outside the scope of Congress’s Article I enumerated powers would have
been frivolous; between 1937 and 1995 the Court rejected every claim that
private conduct exceeded congressional grasp.
Raich, however, thought Lopez gave her claim new legal validity. Since,
as Lopez held, Congress lacked power to prohibit possession of a gun near a
school, did it not also lack the power to prohibit possession of a small amount
of marijuana in one’s own home? The efforts of Justices Stevens and Scalia to
answer that question when the Court, by a 6-3 vote, ruled against Raich were
unusually unconvincing.50 Numerous court watchers concluded that Raich sig-
naled an end to the Lopez frolic and a return to the pre-1995 deferential posture
in questions of congressional power.51
43 See THOMAS B. MCAFFEE ET AL., POWERS RESERVED FOR THE PEOPLE AND THE STATES:
A HISTORY OF THE NINTH AND TENTH AMENDMENTS 143 (2006).
44 Id.
45 See Bryant, supra note 9, at 134–38.
46 See Barry Cushman, Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 67 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1089, 1137–49 (2000).
47 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 588 (1985) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting).
48 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
49 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
50 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 26–32 (2005); id. at 34–40 (Scalia, J., concurring).
For a more thorough discussion of the manifest weakness of Raich, see Bryant, supra note
39, at 146–51.
51 See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Is Morrison Dead? Assessing a Supreme Drug (Law) Over-
dose, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 751, 777 (2005) (concluding that Raich repudiated Lopez
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Yet it remains to be seen whether the parallel between the early twentieth
and twenty-first centuries will end there. At the time of writing, several consti-
tutional challenges to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act are pend-
ing in the lower federal courts. Raich, having demonstrated beyond
peradventure that the Court either cannot, or in any event will not, enforce
meaningful constraints on congressional power, one would be excused for
thinking that congressional power to intervene in a market comprising eighteen
percent of the U.S. economy52 would be a foregone conclusion. So far, how-
ever, the contrary claim has received a warmer reception from the lower courts
than many had expected.53 If the Supreme Court rediscovers federalism for the
purpose of invalidating one of the central provisions of that long-sought, com-
prehensive regulatory scheme, the ensuing decades may resemble the New
Deal Era more than anyone could desire.
and Morrison); Eric R. Claeys, Raich and Judicial Conservatism at the Close of the Rehn-
quist Court, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 791, 818 (2005) (arguing that Raich reveals that
even a dedicated “coalition of judicial conservatives would not be unified enough to undo
the New Deal transformation of Congress’s powers”); Alex Kreit, Rights, Rules, and Raich,
108 W. VA. L. REV. 705, 719 (2006) (asserting that “Raich turns Lopez’s substantive limita-
tions on what activities Congress can constitutionally regulate into procedural limits that
Congress will generally be able to easily overcome”); Thomas W. Merrill, Rescuing Feder-
alism After Raich: The Case for Clear Statement Rules, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 823, 844
(2005) (“Lopez and Morrison have been largely confined to their facts.”); Glenn H. Reyn-
olds & Brannon P. Denning, What Hath Raich Wrought? Five Takes, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 915, 932 (2005) (expressing “doubt that a robust judicially-enforceable federalism has
much future left” after Raich); Peter J. Smith, Federalism, Instrumentalism, and the Legacy
of the Rehnquist Court, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 906, 955 (2006) (“The most enduring legacy
of the Rehnquist Court might simply be its failure to convince those of us with an under-
standable skepticism about invocations of federalism that federalism can in fact be applied in
a neutral and principled fashion.”); Ilya Somin, Gonzales v. Raich: Federalism as a Casualty
of the War on Drugs, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 507, 508 (2005) (contending that
“Raich represents a major—possibly even terminal—setback for efforts to impose meaning-
ful judicial constraints on Congress’ Commerce Clause powers”).
52 COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE ECONOMIC CASE
FOR HEALTH CARE REFORM 2 (2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/docu-
ments/CEA_Health_Care_Report.pdf.
53 See A. Christopher Bryant, Constitutional Forbearance, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 695 (2012)
(discussing the Affordable Care Act litigation).
